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This article examines the impact of the growing Chinese presence in Africa on the 
EU’s international role and more particularly on European development policy towards 
sub-Saharan Africa. The Chinese Africa policy is based on fundamentally different 
principles than the European model with regard to sovereignty and aid conditionality, 
offering an alternative to the dominant European approach. In this article we will argue 
that, although the European development model towards sub-Saharan Africa has never 
been entirely in line with its proclaimed principles, the “China factor” contributes to an 
adaptation of this European policy towards a more pragmatic and less normative strat-
egy. Yet, this does not imply a complete overhaul of the European normative discourse 
which is still the most important source of legitimacy of the European development 
policy. It does however highlight the importance of an open and honest dialogue be-
tween the EU and sub-Saharan Africa, in particular on the merits of the European 
model for the development of the region and its countries.  
Mots-clé : Union européenne, politique de développement, puissance normative, Afrique, Républi-
que populaire de Chine 
Cet article examine l’impact grandissant de la présence chinoise en Afrique sur le rôle international 
de l’UE, en particulier sur la politique européenne de développement en Afrique sub-saharienne. La 
politique africaine de la Chine se fonde sur des caractéristiques qui diffèrent fondamentalement du mo-
dèle européen, tant en matière de souveraineté et qu’en ce qui concerne la conditionnalité de l’aide. Elle 
offre ainsi une alternative à l’approche européenne dominante. Bien que le modèle européen de dévelop-
pement à l’égard de la région sub-saharienne n’ait jamais réellement coïncidé avec ses principes, nous 
avancerons dans cet article que le “facteur chinois” contribue à l’adaptation de cette politique européenne 
à une approche plus pragmatique et à une stratégie moins normative. Néanmoins, ceci ne signifie pas la 
remise en question complète du discours normatif européen, qui reste la source majeure de légitimité de la 
politique européenne de développement. Cependant, cela souligne l’importance d’un dialogue ouvert et 
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honnête entre l’UE et l’Afrique sub-saharienne, en particulier sur les mérites que le modèle européen 
peut avoir pour le développement de la région et de ses pays. 
Introduction 
Today, more than ever, Europe faces a fundamental question: can it still consider Af-
rica as its own “backyard”? Europe has a longstanding commitment to Africa’s devel-
opment, partly because of the former colonial ties between some member states and 
African countries. This “privileged” relationship with Africa has had to adapt to chang-
ing international and European circumstances. Today, the African continent is becom-
ing a coveted partner for many “new” actors such as India or China, which inevitably 
challenges the European Union’s (EU) role as the main trading partner and donor on 
the continent. This also triggers questions regarding the future of the EU’s position in 
the world and more particularly its development policy. In this context, the growing 
presence of China brings the greatest challenge. At the summit meeting of the China-
Africa Cooperation Forum (FOCAC) in November 2009, the Chinese Prime Minister 
announced that China will grant 10 billion dollars to Africa in concessional loans over 
the next three years. This clearly demonstrates China’s overall ambitions to considera-
bly strengthen its ties with the African continent, thus becoming an attractive partner 
for many African countries. 
The aim of this article is to look at the challenges raised by the growing Chinese pres-
ence to the EU development policy in sub-Saharan Africa. Most notably, this presence 
has led to calls for restructuring the current EU aid policy. Since 2000 indeed, the 
European development policy has undergone a significant reform process (Carbone 
2007: 35). The Chinese Africa policy is characterised by very distinctive objectives 
compared to the European development approach, giving the impression of a competi-
tion between European and Chinese models in Africa. This article will however dem-
onstrate that the different nature of the Chinese approach to Africa should not be seen 
by the EU as a threat, but as an opportunity. It pushes the EU to address some key is-
sues related to the normative dimension of its policy.  
Before we begin our analysis of these challenges, several key assumptions need to be 
elucidated. First, it is good to remind the key elements of both European and Chinese 
attitudes towards Africa. Although we can conceive the EU and China as actors in the 
field of development, it appears that the concept of “actor” cannot refer here to the ex-
istence of unitary players. Given that the European development policy is a shared 
competence, it reflects a mix of policies decided at both Member State and European 
levels. Hence, this article will only focus on the European development policy as it is 
conducted by the Commission (Taylor and Williams 2004: 155). Similarly, the Chinese 
policy in Africa refers to a multitude of actors, ranging from individual Chinese entre-
preneurs to state-owned companies and the government of the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC). However, this does not prevent us from distinguishing several common 
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characteristics of the Chinese presence in Africa (Marchal 2008: 236, Taylor 2009) and 
highlighting the holistic nature of the Chinese approach. Furthermore, a major differ-
ence between the European and the Chinese policies towards Africa is their geographi-
cal scope. While the PRC makes no regional division in its relations with African coun-
tries, the EU has three distinctive policies towards Africa: the European 
Neighbourhood Policy for Northern African countries, a Strategic Partnership for 
South-Africa and the Cotonou Agreement for sub-Saharan African countries (Keu-
keleire and MacNaughtan 2008: 288-289). Discussing the European perspective, our 
focus will be on the latter.  
This article will not focus on how the different countries in sub-Saharan Africa re-
spond to the European and Chinese presence. This is not to say that African perspec-
tives and attitudes towards these foreign powers are not important, but the issue has 
been kept deliberately outside the scope of this article as it deserves an analysis of its 
own.  
This paper is structured as follows: First, we analyse the role of the EU as a develop-
ment actor in sub-Saharan Africa. Using the terminology of Ian Manners (2002), we ex-
amine to what extent the European development policy corresponds to the concept of 
“Normative Power Europe”. In a second step, we provide a brief overview of the Chi-
nese policy in Africa to help conceptualise its implications for the European develop-
ment approach. 
1. European development policy in sub-Saharan 
Africa and its normative dimension  
Scholars commonly describe the EU as an entity in its own right, having moved be-
yond traditional state structures to a “hybrid supranational form of governance” (Man-
ners 2002: 240). Ian Manners has argued that because of its history, hybrid polity and 
unique constitutional configuration, the “EU has a normatively different basis for its re-
lations with the world” (Ibid: 241). Coined by the concept of Normative Power Europe 
(NPE), the EU is characterised by the ability to promote beyond its borders its own 
core normative principles, ranging from human rights, democracy and good governance 
to sustainable development and regional cooperation (Ibid: 242). The EU’s foreign pol-
icy plays a key role in this respect. In this article we understand by foreign policy an 
“area of politics which is directed at the external environment with the objective of in-
fluencing that environment and the behaviour of other actors within it, in order to pur-
sue interests, values and goals” (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008: 19). According to 
this broad definition of foreign policy, European development aid can be understood as 
a key component of the EU’s normative aspiration towards developing countries 
(Manners 2008: 24f). The EU’s eagerness to promote specific norms in its relations 
with developing countries is most prominently expressed in the 2005 European Con-
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sensus on Development, the first common European framework in the area of devel-
opment policy.  
For historical reasons, sub-Saharan Africa has always occupied a special position in 
the European development policy and identified as a key region for European efforts to 
promote a value oriented policy (Olsen 1998: 345, European Commission 2005). To 
underline the particular importance of sub-Saharan Africa in the European develop-
ment structure, experts commonly refer to the EU’s “dual-track approach to develop-
ment” (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008: 213), making the distinction between the 
African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states and the rest. The cooperation between the 
EU and the ACP states is based on a number of distinctive agreements, institutions and 
instruments. The 2000 Cotonou Agreement is the current contractual basis of coopera-
tion. À wide range of development policy instruments have been developed in order to 
uphold democratic and human rights principles in its relations with sub-Saharan Africa.  
 When referring to the normative orientation of European development policy, one 
has to stress the importance of political aid conditionality. This entails the linking of aid 
to the fulfilment of various political conditions, relating to human rights, democracy 
and good governance. To this regard, “negative” conditionality involves the suspension 
of aid if the recipient country violates the conditions. In the Cotonou Agreement, hu-
man rights, democracy and the rule of law are marked as “essential elements”, which 
implies that their violation can lead to the suspension of development aid (Keukeleire 
and MacNaughtan 2008: 291, Holland 2004: 286). This “negative” conditionality also 
refers to the EU’s sanction policy. The EU can impose sanctions in two ways: it can 
implement sanctions decided by the UN Security Council or impose autonomous sanc-
tions. These sanctions generally entail measures such as arms embargos, the freezing of 
funds or travel bans for officials. The EU also has “positive” incentives at its disposal 
to encourage the promotion of certain norms.  
Despite these formal principles, Experts have raised serious doubts about the NPE 
concept as an explanatory basis for European foreign policy in general and for devel-
opment policy in particular (Hyde-Price 2006, Youngs 2004, Sjursen 2006). The actual 
commitments of the EU in sub-Saharan Africa to promote the stated values and prin-
ciples have been strongly criticised (Olsen 1998: 345, more generally Santiso 2003: 16). 
It has been argued that within a post-Cold war context characterised by a renewed, 
more ideological rhetoric on aid, and although the EU has followed this general trend 
in the redefinition of aid strategies (Santiso 2003: 19), “there was a lack of ‘serious’ 
European commitment to promote the declared ideals of the first years of the so-called 
new international system” (Olsen 1998: 367). This is often referred to as the so-called 
“rhetoric-behaviour gap” (Wood 2009: 128).  
The EU sanctions policy is a good illustration of this contradiction. Despite strong 
rhetorics, EU sanctions have generally been imposed in a rather mild and unequal way. 
In practice, the EU has only sanctioned very few of the countries which violated the 
agreed norms, and it remains unclear as to how the EU selected these countries 
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(Brummer 2009, Wood 2009). Furthermore, numerous exemptions to sanctions were 
applied, bringing in inconsistency in terms of policy enforcement. To illustrate this, 
Robert Mugabe was invited by the French President, Jacques Chirac, to attend the 2003 
France-Africa Summit despite sanctions imposed by the EU on the government of 
Zimbabwe, including a travel ban for President Mugabe. More recently, the EU agreed 
to temporarily lift the travel ban to allow the Zimbabwean president to participate in 
the EU-Africa summit in December 2007 and, in so doing, accommodated pressures of 
the African Union, which threatened to boycott the summit (Brummer 2009: 201). 
It has been pointed out that, too often, the EU’s normative rhetoric serves only its 
own strategic interests. Development policy specialists refer to this as a problem of in-
consistency of European development policy, where specific foreign policy objectives 
in the area of security (Youngs 2004), energy (Wood 2009) or trade (Storey 2006) trump 
development policy considerations. À particularly striking example for this is the in-
creasing “securitisation” of European development policy, in particular in sub-Saharan 
Africa. As expressed in the European Security Strategy, the security concerns of the EU 
also include non-traditional security threats such as illegal migration (Olsen 1998: 364). 
Although the European development policy and the security policy have traditionally 
been kept apart (Woods 2005: 405), some experts point out that European develop-
ment aid, in an attempt of policy coherence, has sought to fulfil short-term security ob-
jectives at the expense of normative principles like human rights and democracy.  
The ability of the EU to present itself as a normative power in Africa is further un-
dermined by a lack of internal coherence. As already pointed out, Community aid policy 
is complementary to that of the Member States. It is therefore not surprising that the 
European Union and the Member States face many difficulties in coordinating their de-
velopment policies both at the overall strategic level as well as on the ground (Alden 
and Smith 2005: 5). It should be underlined, that although European development pol-
icy is not immune to Member States’ influence, the power of Member States in this re-
gard is not equally distributed. Former colonial powers continue to have unmatched in-
fluence within the European development aid system (Olsen 1998: 347, Zanger 2000: 
308). There are several cases demonstrating the reluctance in the implementation of the 
EU principles and ideals, due to special relations and interests of a Member State in a 
specific African country (Olsen 1998: 363). More importantly, African leaders them-
selves have been questioning the EU’s normative stand with regard to the policy of 
conditionality, claiming that it cannot be a substitute for domestic ownership. The 
President of Rwanda, Paul Kagamé, stressed that “actions will only bear fruit when Af-
rica substitutes external conditionality – that is, doing what the donors tell us to do – 
with internal policy clarity – that is, knowing ourselves what we need to do and articu-
lating this vision clearly to our development partners” (Michel 2007). Furthermore, it 
has also been argued that political conditionality of aid leads to an asymmetrical power 
relationship between the donor and the recipient. 
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To sum up, not only are the normative principles described above key features of the 
EU’s involvement in sub-Saharan Africa, but they also constitute core elements of the 
EU’s international identity. Yet, it seems that in many cases the normative discourse has 
been modified by elements of realpolitik and by strategic considerations. The normative 
characteristic of the EU’s policy has hence come under pressure both from internal and 
external factors. As we will show in the following section of this article, the Chinese 
presence in Africa has become an additional element urging European policy makers to 
adapt the normative discourse of their development policy. 
2. Challenging the EU - China’s approach to Africa 
From a historical perspective, Chinese presence in Africa is not new. During the Cold 
War, the PRC already tried to export her socialist model to the African continent in an 
attempt to rival Soviet expansionism (Thompson 2004: 154). Indeed, for three decades 
(from 1949 until Deng Xiaoping’s arrival to power in 1978) the PRC under the guid-
ance of Mao Zedong has profiled itself as the leader of the Third World, the primus inter 
pares (Marchal 2008: 236) supporting national liberation movements on the continent. 
The strong Sino-African ties that were then established were primarily based on ideo-
logical motives rather than on economic considerations (Geeraerts and Holslag 2006: 
228). Whilst during the 1980s Beijing focused mainly on its internal economic reform, 
the 1990s brought along a renewal in interest in the African continent. There are differ-
ent reasons for this, the most important one being the strong Western condemnation 
of the Tiananmen Square events of June 1989 which left Beijing isolated by the great 
powers and looking for alternative support (Tull 2006: 460-461). These far-reaching 
historical relations between China and Africa add legitimacy and credibility to current 
relations (Bräutigam 2008: 32).  
In general terms, it is possible to distinguish two main drivers behind the current 
Chinese return to Africa. Economically, the African continent serves the fast-growing 
Chinese demands for natural resources necessary to fuel China’s economic growth. 
Contrary to other regions, Africa’s oil and mineral deposits remained until recently 
largely unexploited (Alden 2005: 148). In the eyes of Beijing, Africa also represents a 
huge export market for Chinese goods, as well as it offers major investment possibili-
ties. Since 2000, Sino-African trade has increased dramatically leading Beijing to set-up 
a special Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and a joint Chamber of 
Commerce (Tull 2006: 464).  
In parallel to the increasing number of Chinese trade missions to African countries, 
the frequency of visits of high-ranking Chinese officials followed the same trend (Geer-
aerts and Holslag 2006: 222-223), demonstrating that Beijing does not only follow eco-
nomic objectives, but also find political interest in the African continent. À landmark in 
the process of China becoming a diplomatic actor in Africa was the adoption in 2006 of 
China’s African Policy Paper (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC 2006) just one 
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year after the EU embraced its first Africa Strategy (European Commission 2005). This 
policy paper reflects the importance of Sino-Africa diplomatic relations as a means to 
give China its ‘rightful’ place in the international arena (Taylor and Williams 2004: 83) 
and as a way to gain African votes in international organisations when discussing the 
future of Taipei.  
An important feature of Chinese policy in Africa is aid. There is a lack of information 
provided by the Chinese government on aid delivered to African countries and esti-
mates by experts on the amount of Chinese aid to Africa vary greatly (Lancaster 2007: 
3, Bräutigam 2008: 9). This can partly be explained by China’s particular understanding 
of development cooperation, i.e. the motivations behind Chinese aid being closely 
linked to economic and strategic considerations. Although China has provided assis-
tance to African countries in the past, it is considered as a ‘new donor’ because it has 
traditionally been seen as a recipient of aid by the international community (Altenburg 
and Weikert 2007). Contrary to traditional donors like the EU, China is not a member 
of an international donor architecture, such as the Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC) or the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 
Chinese leaders do not fail to stress China’s particular position as being both a recipient 
and donor of aid, which constitute a useful pattern of resemblance when dealing with 
African nations. Through this discourse of “South-South cooperation” resulting in a 
supposed “win-win cooperation”, China presents itself as an attractive alternative to the 
asymmetrical donor-recipient model of the EU. Beijing wants to distinguish itself from 
European development policy by praising its approach for being more pragmatic, effi-
cient and speedy (Bräutigam 2008: 22). Indeed, Chinese aid focuses in particular on 
technical assistance projects aimed at building infrastructures, a sector which has been 
rather neglected in European aid programmes in Africa in recent years (Grimm et al. 
2009: 20). 
This has sparked the debate on whether China “can be considered a normative power 
in Africa, in the same way the EU attempts to be” (Barton 2009: 12). Chinese leaders 
attach particular importance to a pragmatic policy and, contrary to the EU, refrain from 
advancing any discourse on normative principles. Nevertheless, Chinese policy is de facto 
promoting a unique development model in Africa inspired by its own experience. The 
“Beijing consensus” has become the commonly used notion introduced by Joshua 
Cooper Ramo (2004) to express the existence of an alternative Chinese development 
model based on economic growth without political conditions attached. This approach 
has not failed to attract the attention of many African leaders.  
Two key elements of this supposed Chinese model can indeed be highlighted. On the 
one hand, Chinese aid policy in Africa is characterised by a “no strings attached” prin-
ciple. Chinese leaders do not believe in conditionality and sanctions as a foreign policy 
tool. This could be explained by the fact that much of Chinese aid policy in Africa is in-
spired by its own experience, marked by the American embargo imposed after the crea-
tion of the PRC. On the other hand, Chinese foreign policy is guided by the Five Prin-
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ciples of Peaceful Coexistence1 presented by Zhou Enlai in 1954, among which a par-
ticular importance is attributed to the respect of sovereignty and non-interference in in-
ternal affairs. By contrast, the EU through the European Security Strategy favours the 
concept of “effective multilateralism”, calling for the development of well-functioning 
international institutions and an international order based on shared norms. China and 
the EU have therefore different interpretations of the notion of state sovereignty. 
These differences have become evident at several occasions in the UN, where China, 
supported by African states, challenged the European position (Gowan and Brantner 
2008: 2). For example, as a member of the UN Security Council, Beijing has regularly 
opposed sanctions on Sudan and Zimbabwe, arguing that this would constitute inter-
ference in internal affairs.  
Nevertheless this should not lead us to the conclusion that “China is (…) a normative 
actor, in Africa, in the same way that the EU is” (Barton 2009). Chinese leaders have 
repeatedly rejected claims that they export a specific development model to Africa. Ac-
tually key feature of the Chinese presence in Africa is that it is not following a prede-
fined strategy but, on the contrary, that it is constantly adapting its policy. Like the EU 
value-oriented strategy, the Chinese pragmatic discourse is not free of contradictions 
and is more and more subject to pressure. Recently, Beijing has been facing increasing 
security, social and environmental concerns over its policy in Africa. These include at-
tacks on Chinese oil facilities by rebels in various African countries. As a result, Chinese 
leaders realise the need to take into account broader political, social and security con-
straints specific to each African country in order to protect China’s economic interests 
in Africa. Moreover, Beijing is faced with a number of situations that it cannot handle 
alone, and hence becomes increasingly conscious of the importance of cooperation 
with other actors. This process of adaptation of Chinese foreign policy is referred to as 
a “quiet revolution”, specifically in the light of China’s position on non-interference 
(Small 2007). The most prominent example is the Chinese support for an UN-AU 
peacekeeping mission to solve the conflict in Darfur.  
3. What’s next for European aid?  
What do these patterns of evolution mean for the European presence in sub-Saharan 
Africa and more precisely for its development policy? Most evidently, the increasing in-
ternational importance of China has a test value for the EU’s international influence, in 
particular in sub-Saharan Africa (Marchal 2008: 245). The EU realises that in order to 
                                                           
1 These five principles are: mutual respect for sovereignty and sovereign integrity, mutual non-
aggression, non-interference in internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence. 
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compete with China and remain a relevant actor in Africa, it needs to adapt its devel-
opment approach and turn it into a more pragmatic and partnership-based strategy. 
In particular, the Chinese “no strings attached” policy increasingly challenges the 
European development policy, presenting an alternative source of financing and politi-
cal support to African countries that do not comply with heavy principles. European 
policy makers seem to start adopting a more pragmatic approach as a response to this 
dilemma. Philippe Maystadt, president of the European Investment Bank, stated that 
the EU needs to think about the degree of conditionality it wants to apply, in order to 
avoid “excessive” conditionality. He expressed fears that unless the conditions are set at 
a realistic level, African states might turn to other sources of financing without such 
strings attached to it (Parker and Beattie 2006). It is however important to stress that 
even prior to the growing Chinese presence in Africa, EU policy of “negative” condi-
tionality was increasingly abandoned due to its often half-hearted implementation by 
Member States. Instead, the EU puts now more effort in “positive” conditionality by 
rewarding the good performers. À first attempt of strengthening incentive mechanisms 
is the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), which is a 
rather flexible instrument to grant aid to groups or individuals within civil society, in-
tergovernmental organisations defending democracy and human rights, without agree-
ment from theoretical government. 
The success of the Chinese African policy has also initiated a more fundamental dis-
cussion on the European development policy. Indeed, as a consequence of the PRC’s 
growing international role, the EU faces the question of the universality of its norms 
and values. The NPE concept has been accused of being Eurocentric, hiding a new 
form of cultural imperialism of a “civilising” power which is projecting its own under-
standing of norms onto the rest of the world (Bicchi 2006). African leaders regularly 
complain that EU normative policy is characterised by an unequal relationship between 
the European “donor” and the African “recipient”, leaving no other choice to the latter 
than to adhere to European norms. As a result, African leaders increasingly see Beijing 
as a promising alternative to the European presence (Hackenesch 2009: 2). The Chinese 
rhetoric of “win-win cooperation” is welcomed by many African leaders and it compels 
the EU to adapt its discourse this new reality. Hence recent European policy statements 
on cooperation with countries of sub-Saharan Africa have increasingly referred to the 
concept of “strategic partnership”. 
The most prominent example of the European willingness to move on this issue is 
the recent initiative of establishing a “trilateral EU, Africa and China cooperation” 
(European Commission 2008). While at the beginning European politicians and media 
were harshly critical of China’s African policy (Tull 2008), dismissing its “unethical” 
approach, they have now adopted a less negative tone and undertaken cooperative ef-
forts (Berger and Wissenbach 2007). One could argue that recent adaptations in both 
European and Chinese policies in Africa might lead to closer cooperation on some is-
sues: the EU moves away from a normative discourse towards a more pragmatic ap-
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proach, and Chinese leaders realise that they cannot ignore broader political and social 
circumstances, and that international rules might help to protect their economic inter-
ests.  
Conclusion  
Is the EU really loosing influence in Africa because of China? In this article, we have 
argued that China’s growing presence in Africa does not necessarily imply a marginali-
sation of the EU, but rather represents an opportunity to review it’s current approach 
to development cooperation in sub-Saharan Africa. China’s increasing involvement re-
flects a changing environment to which the EU needs to adapt its development policy 
if it wishes to maintain its strong presence on the African continent. The EU has still to 
develop a fast, coherent, and effective implementation of its aid. The “EU has realised 
that its normative approach in Africa is not fallible” (Barton 2009: 16) and is moving 
towards a more pragmatic and less conditional development policy in sub-Saharan Af-
rica. However, it should also be stressed that the European model holds great potential. 
Indeed, the promotion of human rights, good governance and democracy are pre-
requisites for the development of Africa. China’s close relations with some of the more 
autocratic African states are indicative of its pursuit of short term economic interests. 
In the end, it is up to the Africans to decide on their own development and to choose 
what they consider best from both the European and Chinese models. For the EU, it is 
therefore important to establish an open dialogue and a real partnership with African 
leaders and with civil society in order to show the benefits of the European model.   
The EU now stands at a crossroad: in order to maintain its current role in Africa, an 
in-depth revision of its policy is necessary, taking into account both internal and exter-
nal factors. The coming months and years are crucial in this respect. 2010 will not only 
see the appointment of a new Commission, it will also bring about the revision of the 
Cotonou Agreement. In addition, the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty and the 
newly appointed High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy offer a unique opportunity for the EU to review its policy towards sub-Saharan 
Africa.  
There is evidence that both actors influence each other in Africa (Hackenesch 2009: 
56) and that the Chinese presence contributes to current changes in the European de-
velopment policy. One should however remain cautious about a supposed causality be-
tween the Chinese presence and the mutation of European policy. It is likely that the 
EU will continue to hold a normative discourse, as it represents the main basis of le-
gitimacy of the European development policy. Despite the prospect of both actors 
converging on some points, the European and the Chinese development approaches 
towards sub-Saharan Africa will continue to differ (Hackenesch 2009: 55). Yet, this 
should not discourage triadic cooperation between the EU, China and Africa, which 
creates synergies that are beneficial to the development of Africa. More pressingly, the 
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need for a coherent and effective European development policy has to be addressed, 
especially if the EU wishes to remain a credible international player.  
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